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NEW WINE IN AN OLD BOTTLE-ARKANSAS'S
LIBERALIZED CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE-A BOON TO
THE CONSUMER CLASS ACTION?
Kenneth S. Gould*
I. INTRODUCTION
Prior to 1988, class action procedure in Arkansas was of limited
utility.' Beginning in that year with its decision of International
Union of Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers v. Hudson2 and
continuing through a series of subsequent decisions and a significant
rewriting of the rule governing class action procedure, the Arkansas
Supreme Court forged one of the most liberal state class action
procedures in the United States.3 The evolution of Arkansas class
action procedure from a state of near dormancy to the most dynamic
development under the still young Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure 4
is a fascinating study in the process of procedural rule making and
interpretation.
Examination of the evolution of Arkansas class action procedure
is the initial concern of this article. Following examination of that
evolution, the article will focus on application of Arkansas class
action procedure, as evolved, to the consumer class action, the most
controversial type of modern class action.5
* Professor of Law, University of Arkansas at Little Rock School of Law.
Copyright (c), 1994, bVy the author.
1. See infra part II.A, C.
2. 295 Ark. 107, 747 S.W.2d 81 (1988).
3. As noted by one of the leading civil procedure authorities, "The attitudes
of state courts vary considerably from strong support for the evolving use of the
class suit, particularly for relatively small consumer claims, to a restrictive reading
of the statutes and rules." FiimwG JAMES, JR. ET AL., Crvn. PROCEDURE § 10.22,
at 567 (4th ed. 1992).
4. The Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure were effective July 1, 1979. See
infra note 26.
5. See infra part III. For purposes of this article, a consumer class action
involves use of the class action device for the joint assertion of claims by individual
consumers having no jural connection other than their having been adversely affected
by the same liability producing conduct. A consumer class action has also been
described as:
(A] case in which the plaintiff sues on behalf of a large class of individual
customers or consumers, who cannot be identified in advance and whose
individual claims are too small to justify the cost of individual lawsuits. ...
Such an action may take on a multistate character because the injured
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II. EVOLUTION OF ARKANSAS CLASS ACTION PROCEDURE
A. Arkansas Class Action Procedure Prior to the Arkansas
Rules of Civil Procedure
Arkansas class action procedure prior to the 1979 adoption of
Rule 236 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure was derived
directly from the doctrine of virtual representation. 7 Virtual
representation was a common law doctrine developed in equity.8
However, from the 1868 adoption of the Arkansas Civil Code to
1979, the doctrine was codified by statute in Arkansas. 9 Indeed, as
class reside in a number of states or because . .. the defendants have
their residence or business in states other than the forum.
Archibald v. Cinerama Hotels, 117 Cal. Rptr. 843, 848 (1974), vacated, 126 Cal.
Rptr. 811 (1976).
For a comprehensive analysis of the history, philosophy, and procedural aspects
of consumer class actions, see James E. Starrs, The Consumer Class Action (pts.
1 & 2), 49 B.U. L. REv. 211, 407 (1969). See also James R. McCall, Due Process
and Consumer Protection: Concept and Realities in Procedure and Substance -
Class Action Issues, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1351 (1974); Robert C. Eckhardt, Consumer
Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 663 (1969-70).
Other types of class actions include class actions under the federal antitrust
laws, class actions in patent, copyright and trademark litigation, class actions under
the bankruptcy laws, shareholder class and derivative suits, government benefit class
actions, employment discrimination class actions, and class actions for persons
accused of crimes who are challenging elements of the criminal justice process.
6. Rule 23 and the Reporter's Notes to the rule are set out in full in the
Appendix to this article.
7. For Arkansas class action cases prior to 1979 applying the doctrine of virtual
representation, see, e.g., Ross v. Arkansas Communities, Inc., 258 Ark. 925, 529
S.W.2d 876 (1975); Thomas v. Dean, 245 Ark. 446, 432 S.W.2d 771 (1968); Massey
v. Rogers, 232 Ark. 110, 334 S.W.2d 664 (1960); Mixon v. Barton Lumber &
Brick Co., 226 Ark. 809, 295 S.W.2d 325 (1956); Smith v. Arkansas Motor Freight
Lines. Inc., 214 Ark. 553, 217 S.W.2d 249 (1949); Holthoff v. State Bank & Trust
Co., 208 Ark. 307, 186 S.W.2d 162 (1945); Conner v. Heaton, 205 Ark. 269, 168
S.W.2d 399 (1943); Howard-Sevier Road Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Hunt, 166 Ark. 62,
265 S.W. 517 (1924).
For Arkansas cases prior to 1979 declining to apply the doctrine of virtual
representation, see, e.g., Lightle v. Kirby, 194 Ark. 535, 108 S.W.2d 896 (1937);
Crow Creek Gravel & Sand Co. v. Dooley, 182 Ark. 1009, 33 S.W.2d 369 (1930);
District No. 21 United Mine Workers v. Bourlarrd, 169 Ark. 796, 277 S.W. 546
(1925); Baskins v. United Mine Workers, 150 Ark. 398, 234 S.W. 464 (1921).
8. Although the doctrine of virtual representation was developed in equity, in
1968 the Arkansas Supreme Court held that Arkansas class action procedure applied
to actions at law as well as to equitable proceedings. Thomas, 245 Ark. at 448-
49, 432 S.W.2d at 773.
9. The Arkansas Code of Practice in Civil Actions was adopted by the Arkansas
General Assembly on July 22, 1868 with an effective date of January 1, 1869.
Except for the deletion of one word not affecting substance, from the 1868 adoption
of the class action statute as section 33 of the Civil Code to its final codification
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late as 1975, the Arkansas Supreme Court explained that the class
action statute was but "a codification of the equitable doctrine of
virtual representation."' 0
Ostensibly the language of the statute was sufficiently broad to
establish a liberal class action procedure: "Where the question is
one of a common or general interest of many persons, or where
the parties are numerous, and it is impracticable to bring all before
the court within a reasonable time, one or more may sue or defend
for the benefit of all."" However, the court's equation of class
action procedure with the doctrine of virtual representation meant
that class action procedure in Arkansas under the statute would be
of no benefit to consumer or other interests not linked by the degree
of relationship required by the doctrine.
Under the doctrine of virtual representation as codified in the
Arkansas class action statute, all members of the prospective class
had to have a shared factual and legal interest in the subject matter
of the litigation. 2 This type of commonality of interest in the subject
matter of the litigation required by the doctrine of virtual
representation is not present among the prospective class members
in most consumer type class actions. The prospective class in the
1975 decision of Ross v. Arkansas Communities, Inc." is a good
example of a consumer group among whom that interest is lacking.
The Ross case also illustrates the pre-Hudson attitude of the Arkansas
Supreme Court toward class actions.
In Ross a purchaser of a lot from a real estate development
company sought to represent other purchasers in a class" action suit
against the developer. The representative plaintiffs claimed that the
contracts for purchase of the lots were usurious and that improper
late charges on installment payments for the property had been
imposed.' 4 The Arkansas Supreme Court noted that the required
as title 27, section 809 of the 1947 Arkansas Statutes, the language of the statute
remained unchanged. In its per curiam order of December 18, 1978 adopting the
Rules of Civil Procedure, the Arkansas Supreme Court specifically deemed title
27, section 809 to be superseded by the rules. The rules became effective July 1,
1979. The Arkansas class action statute is derived from section 37 of the Kentucky
Civil Code and section 119 of the original Field Code of New York.
10. Ross v. Arkansas Communities, Inc., 258 Ark. 925, 929, 529 S.W.2d 876,
879 (1975).
11. ARK. CIVIL CODE § 33 (replaced in 1962 by ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-809
(repealed 1978)). In the original Civil Code section 33, the word "where" followed
"and" in the statute.
12. Ross, 258 Ark. at 930, 529 S.W.2d at 880.
13. 258 Ark. 925, 529 S.W.2d 876 (1975).
14. Id. at 927, 529 S.W.2d at 878.
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commonality of interest in the subject matter was not present because
each lot owner's legal interest was limited to his or her own property."3
In Ross and in other class action cases under the statute, the court
characterized this aspect of class action procedure as a requirement
that there be both common questions of law and common questions
of fact applicable to all members of the class. 6
Although the question was not specifically addressed by the
court, the "common questions of law" part of the class action
requirement was probably satisfied in Ross: if one contract for
purchase was at a usurious interest rate, then other similar contracts
would also have been usurious. However, there was no "common
question of fact" as defined by the court because the lot owners
had no legal interest in each others' lots:
The interest of appellant is the right to have the validity of her
individual contract determined. She has no interest in the validity
or invalidity of the contracts of any other purchaser. Similarly
no other purchaser has any interest in her contract. Their rights
being several there cannot be a class action as there is not a
common bond or common claim and each will stand or fall on
its own individual merit. 7
In addition, the Ross court noted that use of class action
procedure must be superior to the bringing of individual suits for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. 8 The view
that class action procedure was not a method of adjudication superior
to individual lawsuits was also typical of the pre-Hudson attitude
of the Arkansas Supreme Court.' 9
B. Facilitating the Transition to a Liberalized Class Action
Procedure: Interlocutory Appeal of Certification Decisions
Perhaps the most important factor facilitating the liberalization
of11 Arkansas class action procedure was aWsemingly ininiiat
ancillary procedural decision in the 1975 Ross case, the case previously
noted as typifying the court's traditional near hostile attitude toward
class action procedure. 20 As an initial matter in Ross, the Arkansas
15. Id. at 929-30, 529 S.W.2d at 879-80.
16. Id. at 930, 529 S.W.2d at 880.
17. Id. at 929, 529 S.W.2d at 879.
18. Id. at 930, 529 S.W.2d at 880.
19. See Cooper Communities, Inc. v. Sarver, 288 Ark. 6, 9, 701 S.W.2d 364,
365 (1986); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Nesheim, 287 Ark. 78, 83-84, 696 S.W.2d
732, 736 (1985); Drew v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 271 Ark. 667, 670, 610
S.W.2d 876, 877-78 (1981).
20. See supra text accompanying notes 13-19.
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Supreme Court held that the trial court's order of dismissal prohibiting
the suit from proceeding as a class action was a final and appealable
order because "the action on behalf of the class members was
ended."' l With the class action aspect of the case at an end, a
"distinct and severable branch" of the case had been finally determined
and the class certification decision was subject to interlocutory appeal. 22
21. Ross v. Arkansas Communities, Inc., 258 Ark. 925, 927, 529 S.W.2d 876,
878-79 (1975); see also Drew v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 271 Ark. 667, 669,
610 S.W.2d 876, 877 (1981).
22. Ross, 258 Ark. at 927, 529 S.W.2d at 878-79. As authority for its holding
that the trial court's order declining to certify the case as a class action was subject
to interlocutory appeal the Arkansas Supreme Court cited an Arkansas case, Parker
v. Murry, 221 Ark. 554, 254 S.W.2d 468 (1953), and the United States Supreme
Court's decision in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Eisen is
of limited authority for the proposition that decisions not to certify a class are
subject to interlocutory appeal because the issue of the appealability of certification
decisions was not considered in that case. The issue decided by the Court in Eisen
was that the trial court's order imposing 90076 of the costs of notice on the defendants
was "a final disposition of a claimed right which is not an ingredient of the cause
of action and does not require consideration with it" and thus appealable as a
final, not interlocutory, order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Id. at 172 (quoting Cohen
v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546-47 (1949)).
Four years after the Eisen decision, the United States Supreme Court held in
Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay that prejudgment orders denying class certification
are not appealable in the federal court system. Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463 (1978). Contrary to the view of the Arkansas Supreme Court, the
United States Supreme Court found that orders passing on class certification do
not "come within the 'small class' of decisions excepted from the final-judgment
rule ... the order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Id. at 468.
In Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Nesheim, 285 Ark. 253, 686 S.W.2d 777 (1985),
the Arkansas Supreme Court addressed the question of whether trial court decisions
certifying class actions were subject to interlocutory appeal. In holding that they
were, the court said:
We did not adopt the federal rule of civil procedure pertaining to class
actions. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. However, we believe it would be best
to allow appeals from such orders [certifying class actions] and our rea-
soning is the same given by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005 (2nd Cir.
1973): An order sustaining a class action allegation involves issues 'fun-
damental to the further conduct of the case'; . . . [sic] the order is also
separable from the merits of the case; and irreparable harm to a defendant
in terms of time and money spent in defending a huge class action when
an appellate court many years later decides such an action does not conform
to the requirements of Rule 23, is evident.
Id. at 254, 686 S.W.2d at 777.
The Second Circuit's doctrine allowing interlocutory appeals of class certification
decisions was, as indicated above, rejected in 1978 by the United States Supreme
Court in Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
Contemporaneous with its decision in the Nesheim case, the Arkansas Supreme
19941
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Without provision for interlocutory appeal of decisions adverse
to class certification, many consumer class action cases would not
survive the decision not to certify. The decision not to certify would
"sound the death knell" 2 of the class action case because as a
practical matter there would not be sufficient economic incentives
for the representative plaintiffs to proceed with the case on an
individual basis to a final appealable judgment.4
The provision for interlocutory appeal of trial court decisions
not to certify class actions allowed presentation to the Arkansas
Supreme Court of class action issues in many of the cases leading
to the liberalization of Arkansas class action procedure. Absent
provision for interlocutory appeal, those issues may never have
reached the court because the representative plaintiffs would not
have pursued the cases to final appealable judgment. In Hudson
itself, the court noted that "the evidence so far shows that each
putative class member has a claim that is too small to permit pursuing
it economically. 25
Court amended Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2(a)(9) to allow interlocutory
appeals of decisions both granting and denying class certification. The appealability
of decisions in regard to class certification is one of several factors distinguishing
Arkansas class action procedure from federal court class action procedure.
23. Prior to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Coopers & Lybrand
v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978), several Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals had
held that an order denying class certification was appealable if it was likely to
sound the "death knell" of the litigation. See Ott v. Speedwriting Publishing Co.,
518 F.2d 1143 (6th Cir. 1975); Hartmann v. Scott, 488 F.2d 1215 (8th Cir. 1973);
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.
1035 (1967). As explained by the United States Supreme Court, the "death knell"
doctrine assumed that without the incentive of group recovery, the representative
plaintiffs would not pursue the lawsuit to a final judgment and then seek appellate
review of an adverse class determination. Coopers & Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 469-
70. In Coopers & Lybrand the Court rejected the "death knell" doctrine for the
federal courts.
24. In the 1991 decision of Summons v. Missouri Pacific Railroad, a class
action involving a class of potentially 5,000 members, the Arkansas Supreme Court
observed:
If a trial court's decision not to certify a class action in this type case
is at all reviewable, then this is the time and the sort of case in which
to review it. That is especially so when it is possible that a large number
of persons who may have legitimate claims not worth pursuing because
of the costs of our system of justice may lose those claims if they are
not allowed to proceed together as a class. By not certifying a class, a
trial court can cause the problem to "go away" to the extreme disadvantage
of the claimants unless that decision is reviewable.
Summons v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 306 Ark. 116, 128, 813 S.W.2d 240, 246 (1991).
25. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Hudson, 295 Ark.
107, 118, 747 S.W.2d 81, 87 (1988). In Hudson, the defendants appealed the trial
court's decision to certify the case as a class action.
[Vol. 17:1
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C. Transition: Arkansas Class Action Procedure from Adoption
of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure to Hudson
From the last of the class action decisions prior to the 1979
adoption of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure to the 1988
Hudson decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court's view of the efficacy
of class action procedure shifted in almost imperceptible increments
from a position of near disdain to one of full appreciation. The
shift is an excellent example of the evolutionary process of common
law interpretation resulting ultimately in the inversion of settled
doctrine. In the case of Arkansas class action procedure, the process
required a series of five decisions over the course of seven years.
Although not recognized at first, the evolution of Arkansas class
action doctrine began on July 1, 1979, the effective date of the
Arkansas Supreme Court's adoption of the Arkansas Rules of Civil
Procedure.26 This set of eighty-six rules was modeled after the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure 27 and was designed to address the need
for a comprehensive and comprehensible body of procedural law
governing the conduct of civil lawsuits in Arkansas. The Rules of
Civil Procedure replaced a hodgepodge of statutes and ad hoc rules
adopted over the course of the history of the Arkansas court system. 29
One of the new rules, Rule 23, replaced the class action statute.
26. The Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted by per curiam order
of the Arkansas Supreme Court issued on December 18, 1978. The order recited
that the Rules were adopted pursuant to legislative authority (Act 38 of 1973) and
the court's '"constitutional and inherent power to regulate procedure in the courts
...." 264 Ark. 964 (1978).
27. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted by the United States
Supreme Court effective September 16, 1938. 4 CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR
R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1004, at 28 (1969).
28. See generally James W. Spears, Comment: The 1979 Civil Procedure Rules,
2 U. ARK. LrriE ROCK L.J. 89 (1979); Walter Cox & David Newbern, New Civil
Procedure: The Court that Came in from the Code, 33 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1979);
Ralph C. Barnhart, Pleading Reform in Arkansas, 7 ARK. L. REv. 1 (1952-53).
29. The Arkansas Supreme Court's per curiam orders of December 18, 1978,
at 264 Ark. 964, November 24, 1986, at 290 Ark. 616, and November 21, 1988,
at 297 Ark. 632, deemed as specifically superseded numerous sections of the Arkansas
statutes governing civil procedure. In addition, a general supersession rule adopted
contemporaneously with the rules deemed as superseded all laws in conflict with
the newly adopted rules of civil procedure. Recognizing that the Arkansas Rules
of Civil Procedure had also supplanted the Uniform Rules for Circuit and Chancery
Court, the court, by per curiam order of December 21, 1987, at 294 Ark. 664,
742 S.W.2d 551, abolished those rules effective March 14, 1988. By the same per
curiam order and for similar reason, the court abolished Rule 83 of the Arkansas
Rules of Civil Procedure which had authorized the adoption of supplemental rules
by local chancery and circuit courts. The effect of that order was to abolish all
local rules for chancery and circuit courts.
19941
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Although much of Rule 23 was a verbatim reiteration of the
repealed statute, a potentially significant change in the class action
standard of Rule 23 was that the conjunctive "common questions
of law and fact" language was eliminated. Under the rule, cases
could proceed as class actions if, after satisfying the other requirements
of the rule, there were "questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class." 30 The one word change proved to be the
opening wedge through which the Arkansas Supreme Court eventually
liberalized operation of the entire rule.
The first case to note the change of the common question of
law-fact requirement from the conjunctive "and" to the disjunctive
"or" was the 1981 decision of Drew v. First Federal Savings &
Loan Ass'n.3' In Drew the plaintiffs sought to represent a class of
persons whom the savings and loan had allegedly charged a usurious
mortgage assumption fee.32 The Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the
trial court's refusal to certify the proposed class. It noted that in
decisions interpreting the repealed class action statute, doubts had
not been resolved in favor of class actions; the statute had been
interpreted restrictively; the court did not copy Federal Rule 23 in
adopting the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure as it had done with
many of the federal rules; and the language of the repealed statute
had been adopted verbatim as subsection (a) of Arkansas Rule 23.33
However, the court did recognize that:
On the other hand, we liberalized our restrictive holding in Ross
by providing in subsection (b) that a class action may be maintained
if the trial court finds that the questions of law or fact common
to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individuaf members and that a class action is
superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. 34
The court in Drew did conclude that the principal question of
law in regard to the legality of the assumption fee was common to
the members of the prospective class. 35 However, it found that
because a number of issues individual to each member of the
30. Following 1991 amendments to Rule 23, the "law or fact" language is now
found in both subdivisions (a)(2) and (b) of the rule. ARK. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(2),(b). Prior to the amendments, the language was found only in subdivision (b) of
ARK. R. Crv. P. 23. Ark. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1990).
31. 271 Ark. 667, 610 S.W.2d 876 (1981).
32. Id. at 668, 610 S.W.2d at 876.
33. Id. at 670, 610 S.W.2d at 877-78.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 670, 610 S.W.2d at 878.
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prospective class would have to be determined, under Rule 23 "a
class action would not be superior to individual remedies." 3 6
In Hudson and later cases the court would recognize that the
matter of "individual remedies" did not necessarily dictate non-
certification of class status. 3" After Hudson the question of individual
remedies could be taken up, if necessary, subsequent to the resolution
of issues common to the class, such as the defendant's liability."
The court in Drew also expressed concern as to whether the
case proceeding as a class action would be "fair" to the defendant
savings and loan.39 Unfairness to the defendant was thought to stem
from the possibility that in a class action the defendant would be
precluded from presenting individual defenses to claims of class
members.40 In Hudson and its progeny, the concern of class action
"fairness" to the defendant was turned on its head by the court's
concluding that a class action would be fairer to the defendant than
relitigation of the same issues in individual suits brought by prospective
class members. 41
In the next case in the progression, the 1985 decision of Ford
Motor Credit Co. v. Nesheim,42 the Arkansas Supreme Court reversed
the trial court's decision certifying the class. Factually the case was
similar to Drew, and the court's decisional process was also similar
to that in Drew. Again, the issue was usury. Again, the court recited
the history of class action procedure in Arkansas, relying on the
pre-Rule 23 Ross case and Drew to note that both the repealed class
action statute and Rule 23 had been strictly construed and that,
"unlike the federal courts, we do not resolve doubts in favor of
class actions." 43
However, in Nesheim the court's now compulsory declaration
of aversion toward class action procedure was limited to a brief,
36. Id.
37. See infra part II.D-E.
38. See infra part II.D-E.
39. Drew, 271 Ark. at 670-71, 610 S.W.2d at 878.
40. Id. at 671, 610 S.W.2d at 878. In regard to the inability of the defendant
to present individual defenses, the court illogically stated:
Undoubtedly First Federal itself treated the borrowers as a class in exacting
a uniform fee for everyone, but its conduct was not fraudulent or criminal.
Consequently we cannot fairly hold [by recognizing class status] that First
Federal is somehow unable to present whatever defense or mitigation it
may have in individual instances.
Id.
41. See infra text accompanying note 77.
42. 287 Ark. 78, 696 S.W.2d 732 (1985), overruled by International Union of
Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Hudson, 295 Ark. 107, 747 S.W.2d 81 (1988).
43. Id. at 83, 696 S.W.2d at 736.
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final afterthought paragraph. In addition, the court clearly laid to
rest its oft expressed concern of insufficient common legal interest
connecting the members of a consumer class:
This Court has little difficulty finding that the prerequisites of
subdivision (a) are satisfied here. Certainly, the parties are
numerous, making it impracticable to bring all of them before
the Court within a reasonable time. It can also be said that a
common question exists as to whether Ford Motor Credit
Company's actions in charging interest at a rate in excess of that
allowed by law and then attempting to correct its contract to
conform with the law gives rise to a cause of action in favor of
its Arkansas customers."
In overruling the trial court's certification decision, the Nesheim
court relied on the subsection (b) requirement of Rule 23 that the
common questions predominate over questions affecting only
individual members of the prospective class and that a class action
be superior to other methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the case. 45 The court found that the possibility of assertion of
individual defenses and counterclaims by the defendant precluded a
finding that the common question as to whether the rate of interest
was usurious predominated over the individual questions.4
The possibility that the individual questions would cause the
case to "splinter" into many individual suits again led the court to
the conclusion that a class action would not be a superior method
of adjudication to individual suits by class members. 47 According to
the court, the possibility of "splintering" was also cause for concern,
first expressed in Ross, about practical problems of management of
the class action:
The splintering of this action into a myriad of individual suits
would, in turn, create serious problcms of m"anageabiity. We,
recognized the importance of such considerations in Ross v.
Arkansas Communities, Inc., 258 Ark. 925, 529 S.W.2d 876
(1975), a purported class action, like this one, alleging usury. In
Ross, we said: Moreover, this Court must be realistic in its
appraisal of the situation, and we cannot ignore the serious
practical problems which would arise if we allowed the case to
proceed as a class action. Considerable expense would be involved.
44. Id. at 80-81, 696 S.W.2d at 734.
45. Id. at 81-82, 696 S.W.2d at 734.




How could the limited staff of the Chancery Court take care of
the necessary proceedings, answer the inquiries for further
information on the 833 transactions and keep the members of
the class advised as to the status of the case thereafter? It is
apparent a maze of procedural difficulties would be encountered.
The procedural problems would be compounded in this case,
involving, as it does, 6,000 separate retail installment contracts."
Just six years later in Security Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Graham,4 9
the Arkansas Supreme Court would find the possibility that the law
of thirty-nine states would have to be determined in regard to one
issue in that class action case would "not seem a particularly daunting
or unmanageable task for the parties or for the trial court."5 0
In yet another example of a basic philosophic view of the value
of the class action that would shortly be inverted, the court in
Nesheim found that neither the prospective class members nor the
defendant were harmed by failure of the case as a class action:
[I]t is significant that no one will be prejudiced by the denial of
class certification. Appellees certainly will not be prejudiced, for
they are perfectly free to pursue their individual claims in this
action. Other similarly situated persons interested in penalizing
Ford Credit are likewise free to file individual actions. 5'
The next way station along the road to Hudson's reformation
of Arkansas class action procedure is a case that likely would have
succeeded as a class action even under the repealed class action
statute. In Cooper Communities, Inc. v. Sarver,5 2 property owners
in a real estate development challenged the developer's use of a gate
house as an office for the developer's real estate salespersons. 53
Because the gate house was owned by the property owners association
and was leased by the association to the developer, all of the
association members had the type of shared legal interest in the
subject matter of the litigation required under the repealed class
action statute.54
The significance of Sarver in the progression toward Hudson
is limited. However, Sarver was the first consumer class action
48. Id. at 82-83, 696 S.W.2d at 735.
49. 306 Ark. 39, 810 S.W.2d 943 (1991).
50. Id. at 44, 810 S.W.2d at 946.
51. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Nesheim, 287 Ark. 78, 83, 696 S.W.2d 732, 736(1985), overruled by International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v.
Ifudson, 295 Ark. 107, 747 S.W.2d 81 (1988).
52. 288 Ark. 6, 701 S.W.2d 364 (1986).
53. Id. at 7-8, 701 S.W.2d at 364.
54. Id. at 9, 701 S.W.2d at 365.
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recognized by the Arkansas Supreme Court under Rule 23.55 In
addition, the court specifically found that the questions common to
class members would predominate over questions affecting only
individual members and that a class action would be a superior
method of adjudication to individual lawsuits by class members . 6
In Drew and Nesheim the predominance and superiority issues had
been the major stumbling blocks precluding recognition of class
status . 7
The final precursor to Hudson, Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co.
v. Morris,58 predates Hudson by little more than one month.59 Morris
involved a prospective class of lessors of several hundred mineral
tracts in three western Arkansas counties.6 The claim on behalf of
the class was that royalty payments on certain natural gas wells
should be based upon the proceeds from the sale of gas from the
wells rather than on "fixed price" leases entered into in the 1940s
and 1950s.61 In conclusory fashion the court found that the numerosity
and common questions of law or fact requirements of Rule 23 were
satisfied .62
Relying on the concern expressed in Nesheim in regard to questions
of fact predominating over questions common to the class, 63 the
defendant in Morris contended that the plaintiffs' complaint raised
individual questions of detrimental reliance, mutual mistake or
unilateral mistake accompanied by fraud, and inequitable conduct
that would predominate over the questions common to the class and
would be better resolved through individual suits.6 Based on the
analysis in its previous class action decisions under Rule 23, the
expected response of the Arkansas Supreme Court would have been
agreement with defendant's argument, finding that the resolution of
the individual questions would lead to the case splintering "into a
myriad of individual suits." ' 65 However, in Morris the court matter
of factly consigned the splintering concern to a position of secondary
importance to the resolution of questions common to the class:
55. The Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted July 1, 1979; Sarver
was decided January 13, 1986.
56. Sarver, 288 Ark. at 9, 701 S.W.2d at S65.
57. See supra notes 36-40, 45-48 and accompanying text.
58. 294 Ark. 496, 744 S.W.2d 709 (1988).
59. Morris was decided on February 16, 1988; Hudson on March 21, 1988.
60. Morris, 294 Ark. at 497, 744 S.W.2d at 709.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 499, 744 S.W.2d at 710.
63. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Nesheim, 287 Ark. 78, 81, 696 S.W.2d 732, 734-
35 (1985), overruled by International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v.
Hudson, 295 Ark. 107, 747 S.W.2d 81 (1988).
64. Morris, 294 Ark. at 498, 744 S.W.2d at 710.
65. See, e.g., Nesheim, 287 Ark. at 82, 696 S.W.2d at 735.
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If the trial court finds that the evidence presents individual questions
of reliance or mistake, it could either defer those individual
questions until after it disposed of the questions common to the
class, or at any time prior .to judgment, order an amendment of
the pleadings eliminating therefrom all reference to representation
of absent persons, and order entry of judgment in such form as
to affect only the parties to the action and those who were
adequately represented."
In Hudson and subsequent cases, deferral became the standard
response to the individual questions concern.
In disposing of the splintering argument, the court eliminated
the last remaining obstacle to the transformation of Arkansas class
action procedure that was to be realized one month later in Hudson.
Nevertheless, the court still felt obliged to close with its standard
declaration of general antipathy toward liberal class action procedure:
Although our class action rule is patterned somewhat after the
federal rule, there is a considerable difference in application. The
federal rule leans toward allowing class actions whereas our position
tends to discourage class actions if the matter can be handled
by individual action. But in Cooper Communities, Inc. v. Sarver
... and Drew v. First Federal Savings & Loan Association of
Fort Smith ... , we held that in determining the appropriateness
of a class action, the trial judge has broad discretion.6 7
Though the court apparently felt compelled to restate its
conservative view of class action procedure, a subtle shift in attitude
is reflected in that closing paragraph in Morris. This shift is evidenced
in the following two ways. First, whereas seven years earlier in
declining to allow class status in Drew, the court noted that, "[i]t
is significant that when we adopted our Rules of Civil Procedure
in 1978 we did not copy Federal Rule 23, as we did many of the
federal rules," ' 68 the court conceded in Morris that Arkansas Rule
23 "is patterned somewhat after the federal rule." 69 Second, the
court in Morris was willing to allow the case to proceed as a class
action based, in part, on its deferral to the "broad discretion" of
the trial judge in making the class certification decision.
D. Evolution Completed: International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers v. Hudson
The Hudson case was brought as a class action on behalf of
''at least several hundred" nonunion workers at a Sanyo plant in
66. Morris, 294 Ark. at 499, 744 S.W.2d at 710-11.
67. Id. at 499-500, 744 S.W.2d at 711.
68. Drew v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 271 Ark. 667, 670, 610 S.W.2d
876, 877-78 (1981).
69. Morris, 294 Ark. at 499, 744 S.W.2d at 710-11.
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Forrest City against an international union and the union's local.70
The claims asserted on behalf of the prospective class members were
for property damage and personal injuries allegedly sustained by the
nonunion workers as a result of union activities'.7
In reviewing Arkansas class action procedure, the Hudson court
admitted that the Arkansas Supreme Court had "not been clear in
the interpretation of Rule 23.''72 Addressing the extent to which
Arkansas had adopted Federal Rule 23 and the change in the law-
fact language in Rule 23 from the conjunctive "and" to the disjunctive
"or," the court said:
It seems apparent that the spirit of the federal rule is to be found
in our Rule 23 even if all the words are not. Our attempts to
cling to our pre-rule tradition may have been inconsistent with
the rule. Reporter's Note 1. states the rule was based on a
superseded statute which contained few procedural guidelines and
that it does not change prior law. While the note is correct in
stating that the rule, like the statute, has a paucity of procedural
directions, we recognized in the Drew case that the law has been
changed to "liberalize" the class action, at least in one respect.
Use of it will obviously be more extensive if there need no longer
be common questions of law and fact. 7
That "the spirit of the federal rule is to be found in our Rule
23 even if all the words are not" is a remarkable conclusion from
a court that only three years previously had contrasted class action
procedure in the federal court system with that in the Arkansas
courts by saying that "unlike the federal courts, we do not resolve
doubts in favor of class actions" and also noting that the Arkansas
rule had been given a "restrictive" interpretation. 74
In regard to liberalizing consumer type class action piocedure
in Arkansas, the Hudson case was also significant for confirming
the shift in the court's attitude in recognizing class action procedure
as being a method of adjudication superior to individual lawsuits
by the potential class members. The pre-Hudson attitude had been
that individual suits by potential class members would almost always
be the superior method of adjudication for consumer type class
70. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Hudson, 295 Ark.
107, 109-10, 747 S.W.2d 81, 82-83 (1988).
71. Id.
72. Id. at 111, 747 S.W.2d at 83.
73. Id. at 116, 747 S.W.2d at 86.
74. Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Nesheim, 287 Ark. 78, 83-84, 696 S.W.2d 732,
736 (1985), overruled by International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers
v. Hudson, 295 Ark. 107, 747 S.W.2d 81 (1988).
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issues. 5 Individual suits would be a superior method of adjudication
even if the case presented some common questions, such as whether
the same legal standard should be applied to the liability issue in
each individual case. A number of individual suits would be superior
to one class action because individual questions, such as the amount
of damages recoverable by each class member or defenses applicable
only to some members of the class, would still have to be decided
by the court on an individual basis even if some common issues
could be determined for the entire class. 76
However, in Hudson the court found that its long expressed
concern about the class action splintering into a series of separate,
unmanageable cases was unwarranted:
By limiting the issue to be tried in a representative [class] fashion
to the one that is common to all, the trial court can achieve
real efficiency. The common question here is whether the unions
can be held liable for the actions of their members during the
strike. If that question is answered in the negative, then the case
is over except for the claims against the named individual defendants
which could not be certified as a class action. If the question is
answered affirmatively, then the trial court will surely have
"splintered" cases to try with respect to the damages asserted
by each member of each of the subclasses, but efficiency will
still be achieved, as none of the plaintiffs would have to prove
the unions' basic liability. 77
In previous decisions the court had also expressed concern about
the fairness to both the plaintiff and the defendant of a class action
which might ultimately splinter into numerous individual cases on
issues such as the damages to which each class member might be
entitled. Addressing the "fairness issue" in connection with the
possibility that the case could splinter into individual cases, the court
in Hudson stated:
Is that [certification of the class] unfair? It is not unfair to the
unions, as they will be able to defend fully on the basic liability
claim, and they will have the opportunity to present individual
defenses to the claims of individual class members if their liability
has been established in the first phase of the trial. They lose
nothing. Would it be fair to the class members to require them
75. See supra part II.A-B.
76. See, e.g., Ross v. Arkansas Communities, Inc., 258 Ark. 925, 930-32, 529
S.W.2d 876, 880-81 (1975).
77. Hudson, 295 Ark. at 117, 747 S.W.2d at 87.
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to sue individually? The evidence so far shows that each putative
class member has a claim that is too small to permit pursuing
it economically. If they cannot sue as a class, the chances are
they will not sue at all. We agree with the unions' argument that
the sole fact that the claims are small is not a reason to permit
a class action, but it is a consideration which has appeared when
other courts, as we must do, have considered whether the class
action is superior to other forms of relief."8
Again, the court's shift in attitude in the three years from Nesheim
to Hudson is remarkable. In regard to the impact on putative class
members of the failure to certify the class, that attitude shifted from
the viewpoint expressed in Nesheim that no one will be prejudiced
by the denial of class certification 79 because class members will be
free to pursue individual actions to Hudson's concern that if class
members "cannot sue as a class, the chances are they will not sue
at all.'' 80
E. Post-Hudson Evolution of Arkansas Class Action Procedure
From Hudson in 1988 to the present, the Arkansas Supreme
Court has considered six appeals challenging a trial court's certification
decision.8 ' The cumulative effect of those decisions has been to make
Arkansas's class action procedure among the most liberal in the
United States.8 2
78. Id. at 117-18, 747 S.W.2d at 87.
79. See supra text accompanying note 51.
80. Hudson, 295 Ark. at 117-18, 747 S.W.2d at 87; see also supra text ac-
companying note 77.
81. The six cases and indication of the specific dates of decisions are: Union
Nat'l Bank v. Barnhart, 308 Ark. 190, 823 S.W.2d 878 (Feb. 3, 1992); Summons
v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 306 Ark. 116, 813 S.W.2d 240 (June 24, 1991); Security
Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Graham, 306 Ark. 39, 810 S.W.2d 943 (June 10, 1991);
Lemarco, Inc. v. Wood, 305 Ark. 1, 804 S.W.2d 724 (Mar. 11, 1991); First Nat'l
Bank v. Mercantile Bank, 304 Ark. 196, 801 S.W.2d 38 (Dec. 17, 1990); International
Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Hudson, 295 Ark. 107, 747 S.W.2d
81 (Mar. 21, 1988).
82. The traditional state court view of the class action device in many states
has been one approaching overt hostility. For example, Judge Bergan of the New
York Court of Appeals in a 1970 decision said of the private class action suit:
"without adequate public control they [class action suits] may become instruments
of harassment benefiting largely persons who activate the litigation." Hall v. Coburn
Corp. of America, 259 N.E.2d 720, 723 (N.Y. 1970). See also the assessment of
state class action procedure in FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR.,
CIvIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1985):
The foregoing concerns [about the efficacy of class action procedure] may
explain the hesitancy of many state courts to give as great effect to the
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The most significant illustration of the court's philosophical
shift in the post-Hudson cases is found in Summons v. Missouri
Pacific Railroad."3 Summons was a "mass tort" type class action
brought on behalf of a class of several thousand persons8 4 who were
evacuated from their homes or businesses as a result of a railroad
accident in which a chemical tank car overturned in North Little
Rock, Arkansas.85 The following elements of that decision reflect
the Arkansas Supreme Court's continuing commitment to a
fundamentally liberalized class action procedure:
1. Criticism of a New York class action case,8 6 in which class
certification was denied, as representing "a traditionally hostile
interpretation of the New York class action rule of the sort from
which we are willing to part.1"87
2. Reversal of the trial court judge's decision not to certify the
class even though in the class action cases from Hudson to Summons
the court had consistently spoken of the trial court's "broad
discretion" in making the certification decision. 8
3. Reversal despite the trial judge's finding that "[a] class action
class suit device as its historical possibilities and the [Federal] Rule 23
precedent have implied that it could have. Whatever the explanation, the
fact is that at least until the 1970s state court interpretations of their class
action rules tended toward a narrow construction of the permissible use
of the device except in the situations where it had been recognized in
equity before the codes . .. and [in] the injunction cases.
Id. § 10.22, at 573-74 (footnotes omitted).
83 306 Ark. 116, 813 S.W.2d 240 (1991).
84. The potential class in Summons could have been as large as 3,500 to 5,000
persons. Id. at 118, 120, 813 S.W.2d at 241-42.
85. Id. at 117, 813 S.W.2d at 241. No member of the class suffered extensive
damages as a result of the accident. As explained by the court:
The accident occurred mid-morning on July 8, 1987. A liquid substance
was observed to be leaking from the overturned car which was carrying
ethylene oxide, an allegedly highly volatile and toxic chemical. The evac-
uation began with an order by local emergency services personnel at
approximately 10:40 a.m. The order was lifted at approximately 4:15 p.m.
when it was determined that the liquid leaking from the car was not
ethylene oxide, but a non-hazardous refrigerant which was part of the
overturned car's container system.
Id. at 118, 813 S.W.2d at 241.
86. Strauss v. Long Island Sports, Inc., 401 N.Y.S.2d 233 (N.Y. App. Div.
1978).
87. Summons, 306 Ark. at 124, 813 S.W.2d at 244.
88. See, e.g., International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Hudson,
295 Ark. 107, 116-17, 747 S.W.2d 81, 86 (1988). The primary point of Justice
Steele Hays's dissent in Summons was that the court had failed to give proper
deference to the broad discretion accorded to the trial court in making the class
certification decision. Summons, 306 Ark. at 130-33, 813 S.W.2d at 247-49.
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proceeding would result in indeterminate and chaotic litigation and
would cause judicial extravagance rather than judicial economy." 8 9
4. The court's favorable view of class action procedure as
enabling persons having claims too small to merit individual suit to
gain access to the justice system:
[I]t is possible that a large number of persons who may have
legitimate claims not worth pursuing because of the costs of our
system of justice may lose those claims if they are not allowed
to proceed together as a class. By not certifying a class, a trial
court can cause the problem to "go away" to the extreme
disadvantage of claimants unless that decision is reviewable. It
is especially important that we review an order such as the one
in this case given the newness of our decision in the International
Union case and the recent changes in Rule 23(a).10
5. The court's reversal of the decision not to certify the class
even though it recognized that with regard to Federal Rule 23,
acknowledged by the court to be the primary source of the Arkansas
class action rule, the Advisory Committee to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure had commented that a class action is "ordinarily
not appropriate" in "mass accident" torts such as those involved
in the Summons case. The Federal Rules Advisory Committee viewed
class action procedure as inappropriate for mass accident torts because
it concluded that questions not only of damages but of liability and
defenses to liability may affect different claimants in different ways.
The Arkansas Supreme Court responded that "[t]he repeated litigation
of the liability question and the attendant possibilities of inconsistent
results in a case like this one outweigh the admitted fact that each
claimant will have different damages evidence.''91
07. a n onUIL,, J.UU rk. at ' A.,, 1. S. ,4 .
90. Id. at 128, 813 S.W.2d at 246 (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 124, 813 S.W.2d at 244. In a jurisdiction recognizing offensive use
of collateral estoppel, there would not necessarily be repeated litigation of the
liability question in a "mass accident" tort case nor would there necessarily be
inconsistent results even if the cases were filed as individual rather than class actions.
Offensive use of collateral estoppel could estop the defendant from relitigating the
liability issue in cases subsequent to a case in which it was found liable in regard
to the same issue. Offensive collateral estoppel was adopted by the United States
Supreme Court in Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 (1979). The
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 29 (1988) defines offensive collateral
estoppel as follows:
ISSUE PRECLUSION IN SUBSEQUENT LITIGATION WITH OTHERS
A party precluded from relitigating an issue with an opposing party, in
accordance with §§ 27 and 28, is also precluded from doing so with another
person unless the fact that he lacked full and fair opportunity to litigate
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6. In support of the court's thesis that the class action is the
superior method of deciding the typical mass tort case, the court,
quoting with approval from a leading law review article, said:
The case-by-case mode of adjudication magnifies this burden
[the expense of litigating complex legal and factual issues] by
requiring the parties and courts to reinvent the wheel for each
claim. The merits of each case are determined de novo even
though the major liability issues are common to every claim
arising from the mass tort accident, and even though they may
have been previously determined several times by full and fair
trials .
92
the issue in the first action or other circumstances justify affording him
an opportunity to relitigate the issue. The circumstances to which consid-
erations should be given include those enumerated in § 28 and also whether:
(1) Treating the issue as conclusively determined would be incompatible
with an applicable scheme of administering the remedies in the actions
involved;
(2) The forum in the second action affords the party against whom
preclusion is asserted procedural opportunities in the presentation and
determination of the issue that were not available in the first action and
could likely result in the issue being differently determined;
(3) The person seeking to invoke favorable preclusion, or to avoid un-
favorable preclusion, could have effected joinder in the first action between
himself and his present adversary;
(4) The determination relied on as preclusive was itself inconsistent with
another determination of the same issue;
(5) The prior determination may have been affected by relationships among
the parties to the first action that are not present in the subsequent action,
or apparently was based on a compromise verdict or finding;
(6) Treating the issue as conclusively determined may complicate deter-
mination of issues in the subsequent action or prejudice the interests of
another party thereto;
(7) The issue is one of law and treating it as conclusively determined
would inappropriately foreclose opportunity for obtaining reconsideration
of the legal rule upon which it was based;
(8) Other compelling circumstances make it appropriate that the party be
permitted to relitigate the issue.
Although the Arkansas Supreme Court has not recognized offensive collateral
estoppel, in the 1993 decision of Fisher v. Jones, 311 Ark. 450, 844 S.W.2d 954
(1993), the court apparently rejected the requirement of mutuality of estoppel. The
mutuality requirement would stand as the primary obstacle to adoption of offensive
collateral estoppel. In Fisher the court also noted that the United States Supreme
Court had approved offensive use of collateral estoppel in the Parklane Hosiery
Co. case, that offensive collateral estoppel is more controversial than defensive
collateral estoppel, but that it was not an issue in the Fisher case. See also the
Arkansas Court of Appeals decision in First Nat'l Bank v. Adair, 42 Ark. App.
84, 854 S.W.2d 358 (1993).
92. Summons, 306 Ark. at 127-28, 813 S.W.2d at 245 (quoting David Rosenberg,
Class Actions for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62
IND. L.J. 561, 563-64 (1986-87)).
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7. In reference to the disparity in resources available to an
individual pursuing a small claim against a large organization and
the organization's resources, the Summons court quoted with favor
from the same law review article:
Because of their costs-spreading advantages, a defendant firm
typically can afford not only to invest more in developing the
merits of the claim than the opposing plaintiff attorney, but also
to finance a "war of attrition" through costly discovery and
motion practice that depletes the adversary's litigation resources.
The consequences of redundantly litigating common questions
thus skews the presentation of the merits, promotes abusive strategic
use of procedure, needlessly consumes public resources, and
ultimately drains away a large amount of the funds available to
redress, by judgment or settlement, victim losses.93
In addition to the liberalizing effect of the Arkansas Supreme
Court's decisions interpreting Rule 23, the rule has been further
liberalized through amendments by the court.9 4 The amendments to
Rule 23, effective February 1, 1991, were made for several purposes:
1. To clarify the procedure by which the person instituting the
class action suit is to give notice to class members of their rights
in connection with the suit; 95
2. To insure that the notice procedure under the rule satisfies
the requirements of the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Phillips Petroleum v. Shutts.9 The new notice procedure was also
added to address the concern of the Arkansas Supreme Court expressed
in the Hudson case 97 in regard to the lack of a notice provision in
the rule; 98 and
93. Id. at 127-28, 813 S.W.2d at 246 (quoting David Rosenberg, Class Actions
for Mass Torts: Doing Individual Justice by Collective Means, 62 IND. L.J. 561,
571 (1986-87)).
94. The amendments to Rule 23 were adopted by per curiam order of the
Arkansas Supreme Court issued on December 10, 1990. That order directed that
the amendments were to become effective on February 1, 1991. The order and the
amendments are found at 304 Ark. 733, 738-41 (1990).
95. See Addition to Reporter's Note, 1990 Amendment, 304 Ark. at 740-41.
96. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985); see Addition to
Reporter's Note, 1990 Amendment, 304 Ark. at 740-41. Shutts, a case under Kansas
state class action procedure, held that when monetary relief is sought, class members
must, as a matter of due process, be given notice and afforded the opportunity
to "'opt out" of the class action. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 798. The 1990 amendments
establish such a procedure for class actions brought in Arkansas courts by creating
a new subdivision (c) to the rule. 304 Ark. at 739.
97. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Hudson, 295 Ark.
107, 747 S.W.2d 81 (1988).
98. The Arkansas Supreme Court in Hudson stated, "[Tihe lack of a notice
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3. To further conform the provisions of the rule to those of
Federal Rule 23."
These amendments also make the procedure more constitutionally
sound. Section III.B. discusses the amendments further in a section-
by-section analysis of revised Rule 23.100 The post-Hudson cases
other than Summons address more specific class action issues. The
impact of those cases is factored into the analysis in Section III,
below, applying the various sections of revised Arkansas Rule 23
to consumer class action cases.
III. CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS UNDER ARKANSAS LAW
A. The Need For Liberalization of Arkansas Procedure: The
Consumer Class Action Under Federal Law
The liberalization of Arkansas's class action procedure is of
particular significance for consumer class actions following the near
demise of the class action device for use in consumer cases in federal
court.' 0 Tracing the history of the federal rule as a potential consumer
protection device, Wright, Miller, and Kane note:
At the time the 1966 revision of Rule 23 was drafted, the extent
of its possible applicability to consumer litigation was not fully
appreciated. It has been in the years since the rulemakers completed
their work that the so-called consumer revolution has come to
the fore and the possible use of the class action for asserting
the rights of buyers of goods and services has been recognized.
Unfortunately, there are very few reported decisions in which
Rule 23 has been utilized effectively by groups of consumers.... 102
The same authority concludes that despite arguments in favor of
Rule 23's potential for serving as a device to vindicate consumer
grievances:
[T]he federal courts generally have not been very receptive to the
expansion of the consumer class action concept .... Until groups
provision in our rule may portend future problems, and it should not be ignored
in any general review of our interpretation of the rule." Id. at 112, 747 S.W.2d
at 84.
99. See Addition to Reporter's Note, 1990 Amendment, 304 Ark. at 740-41.
100. See infra part III.B.
101. For a discussion of the limitations of the class action device in federal
courts, see 7B CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1782 (1986).
102. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 101, § 1782.
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of consumers can overcome arguments [against use of Rule 23],
the effectiveness of Rule 23 as a deterrent against undesirable or
unsavory business practices will be relatively small. 0 3
The arguments cited by Wright, Miller, and Kane against the use
of Federal Rule 23 as a consumer class action device'0 mirror those
used by the Arkansas Supreme Court to deny class action status
during the pre-Hudson era of hostility toward class actions. 05
Because there is no general federal consumer protection law
creating a private right of action,1' 6 most consumer class actions in
103. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 101, § 1782.
104. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 101, § 1782.
105. See supra part lI.A, C.
106. Although there is no general federal consumer protection statute authorizing
a private right of action, some authorities and a few court decisions have attempted
to construe § 43(a) of the Lanham Act (15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. V 1993))
expansively to provide consumer protection at least against false advertising and
other misrepresentations. The Lanham Act generally provides for federal trademark
protection.
The primary basis for the expansive reading of § 43(a) is the provision in the
statute granting a civil right of action to any person who believes that he is or is
likely to be damaged by the use of any false description or representation as defined
by the act. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (Supp. V 1993). However, in the leading case,
Colligan v. Activities Club, 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1004 (1971), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit rejected
the application of § 43(a) for the protection of purely consumer interests. Serbin
v. Ziebart Int'l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163 (3d Cir. 1993), in accord with the holding
in Colligan, contains a comprehensive review of the authorities and court decisions
construing § 43(a).
Under § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988)) "[ulnfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful." Section 12 of the Act
(15 U.S.C. § 52 (1988)) declares that, "[it shall be unlawful for any person,
partnership, or corporation to disseminate, or cause to be disseminated, any false
advertisement . . . ." Under those sections the Commission is authorized to seek
cease and desist orders and other relief against persons using unfair methods of
competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices, including false avetiscm.ents.
However, the Act does not create a private right of action.
A 1969 legislative proposal would have created a federal "Consumer Class Action
Act." As explairred by Senator Tydings, the legislation's sponsor in the Senate,
the act would have amended the Federal Trade Commission Act to extend the
protection against fraudulent or deceptive practices, condemned by the Act, to
consumers through civil actions, including class actions. 115 CONG. REC. 32,142
(1969). The proposal would have amended § .5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act (15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988)) by adding the following: "Consumers who have been
damaged by unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce are hereby authorized
to bring consumer class actions for redress of such damages. . . ." S. 3092, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. (1969).
There are a number of federal statutes providing limited measures of consumer
protection in specific substantive law areas. Class actions in federal court under
those statutes may be possible pursuant to the court's federal question type juris-
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federal court must be brought under diversity of citizenship type
jurisdiction.'07 However, the United States Supreme Court has held
that in diversity of citizenship type class actions each member of
the class must satisfy the amount in controversy requirement. 0 8 This
means that each member of the class must be able to claim damages
in excess of $50,000.109 Most consumers who have more than $50,000
at stake in a lawsuit will want to be in control of the litigation and
will not desire to be subject to the litigational whims of the named
plaintiffs and their counsel in a class action. As a result of the
general negative federal court attitude toward class actions, the lack
of a general federal consumer protection statute, and the amount
in controversy limitation on diversity of citizenship class actions,
very few consumer type class actions are now brought in federal
court." 0 The impact of the liberalized Arkansas class action procedure
can be seen most clearly by applying the various provisions of revised
Rule 23 to consumer class actions, the most controversial modern
class action device.
B. Consumer Class Actions Under the Liberalized Arkansas
Procedure
Application of Arkansas Rule 23 to a consumer class action is
considered in the following section by section analysis of the rule.
1. Class Must Be So Numerous That Joinder of All
Members Is Impracticable"'
The Arkansas Supreme Court has held that a potential class of
as few as seventeen members is too small for class status." 2 However,
diction (28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988)) or other specific federal jurisdictional statute.
Federal statutes providing consumer protection in specific areas are: the Truth in
Lending Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667e (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Fair Credit Reporting
Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); Fair Credit Billing Act
(15 U.S.C. §§ 1666-1666j (1988)); Equal Credit Opportunity Act (15 U.S.C. §§
1691-1691e (1988 & Supp. V 1993)); National Bank Act (12 U.S.C. § 85 (1988));
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988
& Supp. V 1993)); and Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312
(1988)).
107. The federal diversity of citizenship statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988).
108. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-95 (1973).
109. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988).
110. 7B CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1782,
at 60 (1986); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 16.4, at 742-43 (1985);
see also 7A CHARLEs A. WRIuHr, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1756 (1986).
111. ARK. R. Clv. P. 23(a)(1).




the size of the class in cases in which the court held class size to
be sufficient has ranged from 184'" class members to at least 3,500
(potentially 5,000). "4
Although the size of a consumer class action would depend on
the circumstances of the case, almost any consumer class action
imaginable would be composed of a sufficiently large class to satisfy
the threshold numerosity standard indicated by the Arkansas Supreme
Court. The court has not indicated that there is any maximum limit
on class size.
In addition, the court has suggested in a number of cases that
an unmanageably large class composed of members having somewhat
divergent interests could be "splintered" into manageable subclasses
having more closely related interests in common.15 The upshot is
that a consumer class action would undoubtedly be sufficiently large
to satisfy the numerosity requirement, and, even if the class were
composed of thousands of members, the court could manage the
case by creating various subclasses of persons having common interests.
2. Questions of Law or Fact Common to the Class" 6
Prior to the 197S revision of Rule 23, the "common law and
fact" requirement under the old class action statute would have
precluded the possibility that members of a consumer class action
could satisfy the prerequisite of commonality. Although it is likely
that at least one legal issue in any consumer class action would
have presented a question of law common to all class members," 7
no class member would have had a legal interest in the factual basis
of any other class member's claim. As a result, the prospective class
would have failed to satisfy the "common fact" part of the test
requiring that all class members share a legal interest in the subject
matter of the litigation." 8
However, with the change of Rule 23 to require only that a
single question of law affect all class members'19 and with the
113. Cooper Communities, Inc. v. Sarver, 288 Ark. 6, 9, 701 S.W.2d 364, 365
(1986).
114. Summons v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 306 Ark. 116, 120, 813 S.W.2d 240, 242
(1991).
115. See id. at 121, 813 S.W.2d at 242; Lemarco, Inc. v. Wood, 305 Ark. 1,
4, 804 S.W.2d 724, 726 (1991); Security Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Graham, 306
Ark. 39, 44, 810 S.W.2d 943, 945 (1991); International Union of Elec., Radio &
Mach. Workers v. Hudson, 295 Ark. 107, 117, 747 S.W.2d 81, 87 (1988).
116. ARK. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(2) (Revision effective February 1, 1991).
117. The basis for the defendant's liability would be common to all class members
in most class actions.
118. See supra part II.A, C.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 26-36.
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transformation in attitude of the Arkansas Supreme Court to favor
class actions, 20 an Arkansas court considering class certification in
a consumer class action would almost certainly recognize the question
of the basis of the defendant's liability as being a common question
of law among the members of the purported class.
3. Claims or Defenses of the Representative Parties Are
Typical of the Claims or Defenses of the Class'2'
Explaining the "typicality" requirement, the Arkansas Supreme
Court, in the 1991 decision of Summons v. Missouri Pacific
Railroad,22 and quoting the leading authority on class actions, said:
Typicality determines whether a sufficient relationship exists between
the injury to the named plaintiff and the conduct affecting the
class, so that the court may properly attribute a collective nature
to the challenged conduct. In other words, when such a relationship
is shown, a plaintiff's injury arises from or is directly related to
a wrong to a class, and that wrong includes the wrong to the
plaintiff. Thus, a plaintiff's claim is typical if it arises from the
same event or practice or course of conduct that gives rise to
the claims of other class members, and if his or her claims are
based on the same legal theory. When it is alleged that the same
unlawful conduct was directed at or affected both the named
plaintiff and the class sought to be represented, the typicality
requirement is usually met irrespective of varying fact patterns
which underlie individual claims.12
As previously indicated, 24 the Summons case involved claims
of several thousand class members for various damages arising out
of a chemical spill from an overturned railroad tank car in North
Little Rock, Arkansas. 25 Although the named plaintiffs' claims were
only for their inconvenience and fear in having to leave their homes
and for the expense of dining out while other members of the class
had claims for physical harm,126 the court, under the liberal typicality
standard stated above, found the named plaintiffs' claims to be
typical of those of the class. 2 7 According to the court, the plaintiffs'
120. See supra part II.D, E.
121. ARK. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(3).
122. 306 Ark. 116, 813 S.W.2d 240 (1991).
123. Id. at 122, 813 S.W.2d at 243 (quoting HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERO
ON CLASS AcIONS § 3.13, at 166-67 (1985)).
124. See supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
125. Summons, 306 Ark. at 117-18, 813 S.W.2d at 241.
126. Id. at 121, 813 S.W.2d at 242.
127. Id. at 121, 813 S.W.2d at 243.
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claims were typical "in the sense that they arise from the alleged
wrong to the class which includes the wrong allegedly done to them,
and that is sufficient."' 128
The claims of the class members in consumer class actions are
united primarily by the wrong done to all class members by the
defendant. As a result, the claims of the named plaintiffs in a typical
consumer class action should easily satisfy the liberal "typicality"
test announced by the Arkansas Supreme Court in Summons.
4. Representative Parties Fairly and Adequately Protect the
Interests of the Class29
The adequacy of representation issue goes both to the ability
of the named plaintiffs to serve as leaders and managers of the
class action and to the competence of counsel employed to litigate
the case on behalf of the class. 130 In a 1990 case, First National
Bank v. Mercantile Bank,' 3' the Arkansas Supreme Court, citing a
decision of the Federal District Court for the Western District of
Arkansas,32 identified three requirements for service as class
representative:
1. The representative counsel must be qualified, experienced,
and generally able to conduct the litigation;133
2. There must be no evidence of collusion or conflicting interest
between the representative and the class; 34 and
3. The representative must display some minimal level of interest
in the action, familiarity with the practices challenged, and ability
to assist in decision making as to the conduct of the litigation. 35
The Arkansas Supreme Court considered the adequacy of class
counsel issue in both the Summons 36 and First National Bank'37
cases. A review of those cases indicates that the court clearly views
raising and establishing lack of adequacy of class counsel as part
of the defendant's burden. In First National Bank, the court found
128. Id.
129. ARK. R. Crv. P. 23(a)(4).
130. First Nat'l Bank v. Mercantile Bank, 304 Ark. 196, 200, 801 S.W.2d 38,
40-41 (1990).
131. 304 Ark. 196, 801 S.W.2d 38 (1990).
132. Gentry v. C & D Oil Co., 102 F.R.D. 490, 493 (W.D. Ark. 1984).
133. First Nat'l Bank, 304 Ark. at 200, 801 S.W.2d at 40-41.
134. Id. at 200, 801 S.W.2d at 41.
135. Id.; accord Union Nat'l Bank v. Barnhart, 308 Ark. 190, 198, 823 S.W.2d
878, 882 (1992).
136. Summons v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 306 Ark. 116, 813 S.W.2d 240 (1991).
137. First Nat'l Bank v. Mercantile Bank, 304 Ark. 196, 801 S.W.2d 38 (1990).
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class counsel to be adequate in large part because at the trial level
the defendant did not contend that the class counsel was inadequate,
inexperienced, or unable to conduct the litigation, nor did the
defendant raise any allegations of unethical conduct on the part of
class counsel or move to disqualify class counsel from conducting
the litigation. 38 Similarly, in Summons, the court simply noted that
the named plaintiffs had alleged that they were represented by
competent counsel and that the defendant had given the court no
reason to doubt that allegation 3 9
Although the other prerequisites of Rule 23 could be satisfied
with relative ease in a typical consumer class action, the adequacy
of class counsel could be raised through an ad hominem attack on
the named attorneys for the class. Because the Arkansas class action
rule has only recently become viable for prosecution of consumer
class actions, very few Arkansas lawyers can claim experience as
class action attorneys. In addition, questions may be raised in regard
to the attorney's initial attempts (or lack thereof) to notify class
members and otherwise competently prosecute the case as a class
action.' 40 Questions may also be raised as to whether the attorney
has the resources, both in terms of personnel and finances, to
undertake what may well be quite expensive litigation without any
certain prospect of recovery.' 4'
However, in the most recent of the post-Hudson cases, the 1992
decision of Union National Bank v. Barnhart, 142 the Arkansas Supreme
Court upheld class certification despite allegations of improper conduct
on the part of class attorneys. The action was brought to challenge
the authority of the city of Fayetteville, Arkansas, to collect sanitation
fees to pay for costs in connection with an aborted attempt to build
a solid waste incinerator.' 43 The allegations of impropriety by the
attorneys were that the representative plaintiff was "a mere 'pawn
in an action being maintained by counsel,"' and that counsel acted
improperly by soliciting a plaintiff for financial gain and by providing
financial assistance to a client.' 44 In dismissing the allegations, the
court gave scant consideration to the merits of the alleged misconduct:
138. Id. at 200, 801 S.W.2d at 41.
139. Summons, 306 Ark. at 122-23, 813 S.W.2d at 243.
140. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
requirement of notification to the class.
141. See infra text accompanying notes 188-93 for discussion of costs of class
notification.
142. 308 Ark. 190, 823 S.W.2d 878 (1992).
143. Id. at 192-93, 823 S.W.2d at 879.
144. Id. at 194-95, 823 S.W.2d at 880.
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[A]bsent more egregious conduct on the part of the class attorneys,
we do not believe the rights of the plaintiffs should be prejudiced
by denying them class status .... Arkansas has not specifically
addressed the issue, but the few cases in other jurisdictions in
which class action status was denied as the result of an attorney's
misconduct, also involved serious questions regarding the lawyer's
competence, or deficiencies in meeting the other requirements for
a class action.'
45
The court, in effect, also held the misconduct allegations to be
irrelevant to the class certification decision, saying:
When it otherwise appears that the representative plaintiff will
"fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class," allegations
of attorney misconduct are more appropriately addressed to the
state disciplinary committee.' 46
Similar questions may be raised as to the resources available
to the named plaintiffs for prosecution of the case as a class action. 47
In addition, the interest of the named plaintiffs in prosecuting the
litigation may be questioned.' 48 The interest of the named plaintiffs
in prosecuting the class action may be in doubt in many consumer
class action cases because their enthusiasm for the case as a class
action may be considerably less than that of the class counsel who
may be anticipating a large legal fee in the event of settlement or
recovery. 49 In addition, since recovery of the named plaintiffs will
145. Id. at 195, 823 S.W.2d at 880.
146. Id.
147. In finding that the representative parties in Summons were qualified, the
court noted, "Mrs. Summons testified that she understood her obligations in
undertaking representation of the class and the possible costs involved. She said
she would do whatever was necessary in that respect." Summons v. Missouri Pac.
R.R., 306 Ark. 116, 122, 813 S.W.2d 240, 243 (1991).
148. First Nat'l Bank v. Mercantile Bank, 304 Ark. 196, 200-01, 801 S.W.2d
38, 41 (1990).
149. Although in general Arkansas follows the American rule "that attorney fees
are not chargeable as costs in litigation unless specifically permitted by statute,"
the Arkansas Supreme Court has recognized an exception "where a plaintiff has
created or augmented a common fund or where assets have been salvaged for the
benefit of others as well as the plaintiff." Millsap v. Lane, 288 Ark. 439, 442,
706 S.W.2d 378, 379-80 (1986). Although to date the court has recognized the
common fund doctrine as applying to the determination of attorneys' fees in illegal
exaction cases, the underlying rationale for the doctrine should also apply to
attorneys' fees in consumer class action cases. In the 1934 decision of Marlin v.
Marsh & Marsh, 189 Ark. 1157, 76 S.W.2d 965 (1934), the court stated that
rationale:
When many persons have a common interest in a fund, and one of them,
for the benefit of all brings a suit for its preservation, and retains counsel
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be on the same basis as members of the class generally, there may
be a lack of enthusiasm for prosecution of the case on the part of
the named plaintiffs. 10
at his own cost, a court of equity will order a reasonable amount paid
to him out of the funds ....
Id. at 1157, 76 S.W.2d at 966.
In the leading Arkansas case, Powell v. Henry, 267 Ark. 484, 592 S.W.2d 107
(1980), the Arkansas Supreme Court upheld the trial court's award of attorneys'
fees of $95,884.31 for recovery of a fund of $639,226.24 in an illegal exaction
suit brought on behalf of electrical customers of the City of North Little Rock,
Arkansas. The fee was calculated on the basis of 15% of the fund. In Powell the
court commented on the factors to be considered in determining the amount of
attorneys' fees in a common fund case:
While the time spent is an important element to be considered in determining
the reasonable value of an attorney's services, it is not the controlling
factor, and is sometimes a minor one. Love v. U. S. F. & G. Co., 263
Ark. 925, 568 S.W.2d 746. We have recently had occasion to address our
attention to the relationship of time records and the expenditure of time
in relation to the allowance of attorney's fees in Lytle v. Lytle, 266 Ark.
-- , 583 S.W.2d 1. There we found that other factors were just as important
as the time devoted to a case. In Marlin v. Marsh, supra, we pointed
out that the amount of the recovery was important and indicated that the
trial court properly took into consideration the ability of counsel, the
nature and extent of the services rendered and the result obtained. The
chancellor who made the allowance here, and whose action was reinstated
by the regular chancellor, took these factors into consideration. Although
such allowances should not be entirely on a contingent fee basis, they
should be such that competent lawyers would not refuse to accept em-
ployment in cases of this sort. Old Republic Insurance Co. v. Alexander,
245 Ark. 1029, 436 S.W.2d 829. Naturally the uncertainty of ultimate
recovery is an element to be considered in accomplishing this purpose.
Powell, 267 Ark. at 487-88, 592 S.W.2d at 109; see also Pledger v. Bosnick, 306
Ark. 45, 56-57, 811 S.W.2d 286, 293-94 (1991); American Truck Ass'ns, Inc. v.
Gray, 295 Ark. 43, 47, 746 S.W.2d 377, 379 (1988); Millsap v. Lane, 288 Ark.
439, 442-43, 706 S.W.2d 378, 379-80 (1986); Crittenden County v. Williford, 283
Ark. 289, 292, 675 S.W.2d 631, 633-34 (1984).
The award of attorneys' fees in illegal exaction type class cases in Arkansas is
now controlled by statute. Section 26-35-902 of the Arkansas statutes provides:
(a) It is the public policy of this state that circuit and chancery courts
may, in meritorious litigation brought under Arkansas Constitution, Article
16, s 13, in which the court orders any county, city, or town to refund
or return to taxpayers moneys illegally exacted by the county, city, or
town, apportion a reasonable part of the recovery of the class members
to attorneys of record and order the return or refund of the balance to
the members of the class represented. ...
Ark. Code Ann. § 26-35-902(a) (Michie Supp. 1993). In Bahil v. Scribner, 265 Ark.
834, 841, 581 S.W.2d 334, 338 (1979), the Arkansas Supreme Court held that 26-
35-902 applies only to suits brought against counties, cities, or towns.
For a discussion of the standards for common fund fee awards generally, see
HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERO ON CLAss AcTIONS § 14.03, at 14-
3 to 14-16 (1992).
150. A class action plaintiff is ordinarily ineligible for preferential recovery. As
noted by the leading class action authority:
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Another aspect of the "fair and adequate representation"
requirement is that the class representative's interest must not be in
conflict with that of other class members. 5' The defendants in
Barnhart attempted to defeat class certification by submitting affidavits
of six residents of Fayetteville, members of the pbtential class, who
felt that the class action would be harmful to their community and
who thus opposed the class action. 52 On the basis of that opposition,
the defendants argued that the named plaintiff's interest conflicted
with that of other members of the class. 53 Although the court did
recognize that the adequate representation requirement may be
jeopardized at some point if the interest of the named plaintiffs
conflicts with that of other class members, 5 4 the court found that
the opposition of six class members of a class of thousands did not
justify decertification.' 5
The normal rule in a class action is that a class representative may not
obtain a disproportionate or preferential allocation from a lump sum class
recovery but must be treated the same as all other absent members of
the class. This rule applies even when the original class plaintiffs bear the
obligation of litigation expenses in the event a class action is unsuccessful,
and may be obligated to pay attorney's fees on a contingent contractual
arrangement that may be higher than fees chargeable against recoveries
by absent class members.
HERBERT NEWBERG ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 21.20, at 21-
40 (1992).
Newberg also notes other disadvantages for the named plaintiffs in a class
action as compared with individual actions:
(1) The .named plaintiffs will have additional responsibilities in the nature
of a fiduciary duty for protecting class interests; (2) Pursuing relief on a
class basis may delay individual relief; (3) Individual settlements may be
more difficult after commencement of the class action; (4) The named
plaintiffs may bear larger litigation expenses than other class members in
unsuccessful class actions; (5) Counsel for class members may enter an
appearance in the class action or class members may formally intervene,
diminishing the named plaintiffs' control of the litigation; (6) More precise
pleading of liability may be required; (7) The named plaintiffs may be
exposed to a broader array of defense tactics; (8) The defendant may raise
counterclaims against the class that would not be pursued in individual
litigation; (9) The class action may diminish the named plaintiffs' latitude
to choose the forum; and (10) The named plaintiffs and their counsel may
be exposed to broader discovery on class issues.
HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON" CLASS ACTIONS §§ 5.23-5.32, at
5-26 to 5-33 (1992).
151. At some point conflict of interests between the named class representatives
and other class members can rise to the level of Constitutional due process con-
siderations. The leading United States Supreme Court decision is Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32 (1940).







Though not effective at the time of the trial court's decision
in Barnhart, revised Rule 23 allows class members opposed to the
litigation or who feel they are not being fairly and adequately
represented to avoid the binding effect of a judgment in a class
action by exercising their right under 23(c)(2) to be excluded from
the class. 56 To "opt out," the class member merely has to request
exclusion by a specified date. No reason need be given. In a recent
decision' 7" involving the question of an unnamed class member's
standing to appeal an order approving attorney's fees and costs in
a class action, the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that unsatisfied
class members have a number of alternatives in addition to "opting
out":
An unsatisfied class member's options are to move to intervene
as of right, collaterally attack the settlement approval by filing
a separate suit challenging the adequacy of the class representation,
or he may opt out. The rationale of the class action is to render
manageable litigation involving numerous class members who would
otherwise all have access to court via individual lawsuits. As was
emphasized in Croyden, if each dissatisfied class member could
appeal individually, litigation would be uncontrollable, and the
purpose of class actions would be defeated."8
Although, as suggested above, an attack on the adequacy of
representation directed at either class counsel or the named plaintiffs
may be successful, to date the attitude of the Arkansas Supreme
Court toward such attacks has been to consider the problem of
adequacy of representation a matter to be resolved through the trial
judge's obligation to exercise discretion in managing and controlling
the litigation. For instance, in First National Bank v. Mercantile
Bank 159 the court summarized its conclusion that the class was
adequately represented, saying that:
[A]t any stage of the litigation the court may impose terms that
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
"Whenever the representation appears to the court inadequate
fairly to protect the interests of absent parties who may be bound
by the judgment, the court may at any time" enter an order to
eliminate any reference to representation of absent persons. Ark.
R. Civ. P. 23(d). In this manner the trial court maintains constant
control over the litigation. 60
156. The effective date of the "opt out" provision of Rule 23 was February 1,
1991.
157. Haberman v. Lisle, 317 Ark. 600, 879 S.W.2d 444 (1994).
158. Id. at 603, 879 S.W.2d at 445-46 (citing Croyden Assoc. v. Alleco, Inc.,
969 F.2d 675 (8th Cir. 1992)).
159. 304 Ark. 196, 801 S.W.2d 38 (1990).
160. Id. at 199-200, 801 S.W.2d at 40.
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Thus, our affirmance today does not end the trial court's role
with respect to this case. If at any time the court finds that the
representation by [the named plaintiffs] or their counsel is
inadequate, it may require additional terms and conditions to
protect against any unfairness pursuant to Rule 23(d). 6'
As a result, even if substantial adequacy of representation issues in
a consumer class action case could be raised, those issues might
well be addressed by the trial court's modification of the class action
structure or even by imposition of terms and conditions in regard
to the prosecution of the case by class counsel and the named
plaintiffs.
5. Questions of Law or Fact Common to the Members of
the Class Must Predominate Over Any Questions
Affecting Only Individual Members'62
This basic requirement of class actions adopts the previously
discussed class action prerequisite that there be common questions
of law or fact, and, in addition, requires that the common questions
predominate over any questions that may affect only individual class
members. In decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court prior to the
1988 Hudson 63 case, class action treatment was frequently denied
based on the court's finding that individual determinations of damages
or defenses would preclude class treatment. Class treatment would
be precluded because such individual questions would predominate
over any common questions.'6
As with other aspects of the class action procedure, the Arkansas
Supreme Court's attitude with regard to the "predominance"
requirement shifted radically with the Hudson decision. 65 Now the
emphasis of the court's approach is on resolving the common questions
of law or fact by way of one trial. The thrust of recent Arkansas
Supreme Court decisions requires the trial court to resolve differing
defenses and claims for damages by creation of subclasses or by
"splintering" the class action into individual cases.'6 As a result,
161. Id. at 201, 801 S.W.2d at 41.
162. ARK. R. Civ. P. 23(b).
163. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Hudson, 295 Ark.
107, 747 S.W.2d 81 (1988).
164. See, e.g., Ross v. Arkansas Communities, Inc., 258 Ark. 925, 930-32, 529
S.W.2d 876, 880-81 (1975).
165. Hudson, 295 Ark. at 119-20, 747 S.W.2d at 87-88.
166. Id.; see also Lemarco, Inc. v. Wood, 305 Ark. 1, 4, 804 S.W.2d 724, 726
(1991); Security Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Graham, 306 Ark. 39, 44, 810 S.W.2d
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even though a consumer class action would surely involve individual
questions of damages or defenses, those individual questions would
not "predominate" over common questions such as the defendant's
liability.
6. Class Action Must Be "Superior to Other Available
Methods for the Fair and Efficient Adjudication of the
Controversy" 67
Although there is considerable overlap between this requirement
and the "predominance of common questions of law or fact"
requirement discussed above,'" the Arkansas Supreme Court has
used this aspect of the class action requirements to consider class
action treatment of the case under a summary "fairness and efficiency"
analysis. 69 What the court means by fairness in this context is whether
class certification "would be fair to all the parties."' 70
In post-Hudson cases the court has invariably determined the
"fairness" question in favor of class certification.' 7' Class certification
has been found to be fair to the defendant because the defendant
receives an opportunity to present a full, albeit single, defense to
the common class claims. 72 Furthermore, individual defenses to
claims of individual class members can be preserved for subclass or
individual determination if liability is established on the common
claims. 73 The court has also pointed to the single defense factor as
943, 945 (1991); Summons v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 306 Ark. 116, 120-25, 813 S.W.2d
240, 242-45 (1991). In addition, in Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Morris, decided
fewer than two months prior to Hudson, the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed
the trial court's certification of a class action, noting that individual questions
could be deferred until after the court disposed of the question common to the
class. Arkansas La. Gas Co. v. Morris, 294 Ark. 496, 499, 744 S.W.2d 709, 710
(1988).
167. ARK. R. Crv. P. 23(b).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 162-66.
169. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Hudson, 295 Ark.
107, 117-18, 747 S.W.2d 81, 86-87 (1988).
170. Id.
171. In each of the five class action cases considered by the Arkansas Supreme
Court since the Hudson decision in 1988, the court has ruled in favor of class
certification. Those decisions are: Union Nat'l Bank v. Barnhart, 308 Ark. 190,
823 S.W.2d 878 (1992); Lemarco, Inc. v. Wood, 305 Ark. 1, 804 S.W.2d 724(1991); Security Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Graham, 306 Ark. 39, 810 S.W.2d 943(1991); Summons v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 306 Ark. 116, 813 S.W.2d 240 (1991);
First Nat'l Bank v. Mercantile Bank, 304 Ark. 196, 801 S.W.2d 38 (1990).
172. See supra part II.E.
173. See supra part II.E.
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a benefit to the defendant. That is, the defendant will not be exposed
to relitigation of common issues, particularly the liability question . 7
From the plaintiffs' standpoint, the court has repeatedly
emphasized that, in consumer class action cases, each putative class
member usually has a claim that is too small to be economically
feasible to pursue on an individual basis. 75 As a result, if the affected
consumers cannot sue as a class, they will probably not be able to
have a potentially legitimate claim resolved at all. 76 Thus, in the
court's view, refusing class certification would not be fair to the
class members. 77
A 1991 decision of the Arkansas Supreme Court considered the
related question of efficiency of adjudication for the parties and
the court. In Security Benefit Life Insurance Co. v. Graham, 78 the
defendant argued that resolution of one issue in the case would
require exploration and possible application of the law of thirty-
nine states, resulting in inefficient adjudication of the matter. 79 In
response, the court found that reference to the laws of thirty-nine
states would "not seem a particularly daunting or unmanageable
task for the parties or for the trial court.' ' 80
174. Security Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Graham, 306 Ark. 39, 45, 810 S.W.2d
943, 946 (1991); see also Summons v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 306 Ark. 116, 124, 813
S.W.2d 240, 244 (1991).
175. See, e.g., Summons v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 306 Ark. 116, 128, 813 S.W.2d
240, 246 (1991). In Summons the class was composed of persons who were evacuated
from their homes or businesses as the result of a railroad accident in which a
chemical tank car overturned. Damage claims ranged from claims for compensation
for medical treatment, pain and suffering, and loss of income to relatively nominal
claims seeking reimbursement for money spent for food, clothing, and temporary
shelter. Id. at 118-19, 813 S.W.2d at 241.
176. Id. at 128, 813 S.W.2d at 246.
177. See, e.g.. International Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. Hudson,
295 Ark. 107, 117-18, 747 S.W.2d 81, 87 (1988).
178. Security Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Graham, 306 Ark. 39, 810 S.W.2d 943
(1991).
179. Id. at 44, 810 S.W.2d at 945.
180. Id. at 44, 810 S.W.2d at 946. Six years earlier the court had expressed
grave concern about similar practical problems resulting from class certification:
[Tlhis Court must be realistic in its appraisal of the situation, and we
cannot ignore the serious practical problems which would arise if we
allowed the case to proceed as a class action. Considerable expense would
be involved. How could the limited staff of the Chancery Court take care
of the necessary proceedings, answer the inquiries for further information
on the 833 transactions and keep the members of the class advised as to
the status of the case thereafter? It is apparent a maze of procedural
difficulties would be encountered. The procedural problems would be
compounded in this case, involving, as it does, 6,000 separate retail in-
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The court in Graham also decided that class certification would
resolve several common questions and would be efficient for and
fair to the parties.' According to the court, the alternative of suits
in thirty-nine states would be comparatively "inefficient, duplicative
[of effort], and a drain on judicial resources."'1 2
A summary statement of the present attitude of the Arkansas
Supreme Court toward the superiority, fairness, and efficiency
questions is that the defendant loses nothing through class certification,
class members gain access to judicial determination of claims that
would otherwise go unheard, and efficient use of judicial resources
results through avoiding repeated litigation of common issues. Not
all of the post-Hudson cases can be characterized as being "consumer
class actions."'8 3 However, there is no reason to think that the
"fairness and efficiency" issues in a typical consumer class action
suit would be sufficiently unique to result in different treatment of
those issues.
7. Notice Must Be Given to Members of the Class'14
The requirement that notice be given to the class arises only
after the case has been certified as a class action and, according to
the terms of Rule 23(c), applies "in any class action in which
monetary relief is sought, including actions for damages and restitution
.... 5 The notice must be given individually to all members of
stallment contracts.
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Nesheim, 287 Ark. 78, 82-83, 696 S.W.2d 732, 735
(1985) (quoting Ross v. Arkansas Communities, Inc., 258 Ark. 925, 930, 529 S.W.2d
876, 880 (1975)).
181. Graham, 306 Ark. at 44-45, 810 S.W.2d at 945-46.
182. Id. at 44-45, 810 S.W.2d at 946.
183. The class action cases decided subsequent to Hudson are Union Nat'l Bank
v. Barnhart, 308 Ark. 190, 823 S.W.2d 878 (1992); Lemarco, Inc. v. Wood, 305
Ark. 1, 804 S.W.2d 724 (1991); Security Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Graham, 306
Ark. 39, 810 S.W.2d 943 (1991); Summons v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 306 Ark. 116,
813 S.W.2d 240 (1991); First Nat'l Bank v. Mercantile Bank, 304 Ark. 196, 801
S.W.2d 38 (1990).
184. ARK. R. Crv. P. 23(c).
185. Arkansas Rule 23 does not clearly indicate at what point notice is to be
given. Wright, Miller, and Kane note that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 also
leaves unanswered the question of the timing of notice. 7B CHARLEs A. WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1788, at 222 (1986). As to the point
at which notice should be given to the class, Wright, Miller, and Kane state:
[N]otice must be sent long before the merits of the case are adjudicated
and, indeed, probably should be sent as soon as possible after the action
is commenced; as a practical matter, this means as soon as the court
determines that the class action is proper under subdivision (c)(1).
Id. § 1788, at 222-23.
In regard to the timing of class certification, Arkansas Rule 23(b) provides that,
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the class who can be identified through reasonable effort. 186 Under
Rule 23(c) the contents of the notice must:
(1) [Djescribe the action and the members' rights in it; (2) advise
each member that the court will exclude the member from the
class if the member so requests by a specified date; (3) advise
each member that the judgment, whether favorable or not, will
include all members who do not request exclusion; and (4) state
that any member who does not request exclusion may ...
"As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained."
ARK. R. CIrv. P. 23(b).
186. ARK. R. Civ. P. 23(c). In "illegal exaction" class suits brought under Article
16, § 13 of the Arkansas Constitution individual notice may not be required. Article
16, § 13 provides:
Any citizen of any county, city or town may institute suit in behalf of
himself and all others interested, to protect the inhabitants thereof against
the enforcement of any illegal exactions whatever.
In City of Little Rock v. Cash the Arkansas Supreme Court held that Rule 23
applied to "illegal exaction" cases. City of Little Rock v. Cash, 277 Ark. 494,
510, 644 S.W.2d 229, 236 (1982). Since Cash arose before the 1991 amendments
to Rule 23 requiring individual notice to all members of the class, whether the
individual notice requirement would apply to illegal exaction cases is not clear.
Because illegal exaction cases are generally brought on behalf of the citizens of a
governmental entity to challenge illegal taxes or expenditures, if the individual notice
requirement did apply, the costs of notice to all affected citizens could, in many
instances, be prohibitive.
Justice Glaze, concurring in Union Nat'l Bank v. Barnhart, 308 Ark. 190, 823
S.W.2d 878 (1992), argued that the holding in Cash applying Rule 23 to illegal
exaction cases should be reversed. In regard to the application of Rule 23's notice
requirement to illegal exaction cases, Justice Glaze said:
I suggest that the application of Rule 23 to illegal exaction suits makes
little sense except that the notice requirement afforded under Rule 23 does
assure notice to all taxpayers, thus guarding against the so-called 'friendly
lawsuit' filed by parties attempting to protect their private or vested interests
in ,,,hat is hascally an action involving the public's interests, Such notice,
however, can be afforded by a well-drafted rule or law without also
requiring all the impediments presented under Rule 23. Clearly, an illegal
exaction proceeding differs from the type class action contemplated under
Rule 23 where the primary objective is a suit for damages.
Id. at 200, 823 S.W.2d at 883.
A narrower construction upholding the Cash case's application of Rule 23 to
illegal exaction cases but without application of the individual notice requirement
is possible. That construction would recognize that the individual notice requirement
of subsection (c) by its terms does not apply to the type of relief sought in illegal
exaction cases. Rule 23(c) applies only to class actions "in which monetary relief
is sought, including actions for damages and restitution . . . ." ARK. R. Civ. P.
23(c). The primary relief sought in an illegal exaction suit is the enjoining of an
illegal act on the part of the governmental entity. The prospect of recovery of
illegally collected taxes or illegally expended funds is an ancillary by-product of
the relief sought "against the enforcement of" the illegal exaction. The remedy
sought in illegal exaction cases is not in the nature of the compensatory type of
relief contemplated by Rule 23(c).
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participate in the litigation, either in person or through [his or
her own] counsel. 87
The requirement that notice be given to each member of the
class individually is in accord with the United States Supreme Court's
holding on due process requirements in its 1985 decision of Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.
88
Under Rule 23, the cost of notice is to be borne initially by
the named plaintiffs; 8 9 in a consumer class action, this can be
prohibitively expensive. The cheapest form of acceptable notice is
most likely to be certified mail with return receipt requested at a
current cost of $2.29, so, even if the notice could be sent for a
total cost of $3.00 per class member, the cost of notice to a class
of relatively modest size would be considerably high.'9g
Few consumers with a potential personal recovery of the small
amount sought per class member in a typical consumer class action
would be willing to risk an expenditure of several thousand dollars
necessary for class notification: there would be no guarantee of
recovery, 19' and the case would not have been heard on its merits
187. ARK. R. Cirv. P. 23(c).
188. 472 U.S. 797 (1985). The Court also held that a state may exercise jurisdiction
over the claim of a nonresident member of a plaintiff class even though the class
member "may not possess the minimum contacts with the [jurisdiction] which would
support personal jurisdiction over a defendant." Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts,
472 U.S. 797, 811 (1985).
189. ARK. R. Crv. P. 23(c). The rule does provide that "the court may shift
all or part of such cost to the opposing party or parties if the case is settled or
the class representative substantially prevails on the merits." Id.
190. For instance, the class in Summons v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 306 Ark. 116,
813 S.W.2d 240 (1991), could have been as large as 5,000 individuals. Id. at 118,
813 S.W.2d at 241. Assuming the cost of notice of $3.00 per class member, the
representative plaintiffs or their attorneys would possibly have had to expend $15,000
for the cost of notice alone before any judicial consideration of the merits of their
claim.
191. In Summons the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that a decision to certify
a case as a class action does not reflect in any way on the wholly different question
of whether the class should recover. At the close of its opinion in Summons the
court stated:
We conclude this opinion with a caveat; the only issue we have addressed
is whether the class should have been certified. We have not intimated,
nor have we meant to intimate, that any of the class members will or
should recover. The question of liability is not at all before us.
Summons, 306 Ark. at 129, 813 S.W.2d at 247.
Similarly, the court has also recently noted that "[an inquiry into the merits
has been held inappropriate in determining whether an action may be maintained
as a class action under Fed. Rule 23." First Nat'l Bank v. Mercantile Bank, 304
Ark. 196, 201, 801 S.W.2d 38, 41 (1990) (quoting Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156 (1974)).
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at the time before trial when the class would have to be notified. 92
As a practical matter, counsel for the named plaintiffs will have
to initially bear the cost of giving notice to the class. 93 Few attorneys
would be willing to incur that expense knowing that the prospects
of ultimate recovery and the resultant shifting of the cost of notice
to the defendant' 94 would be speculative. In addition, litigation could
be very expensive to pursue, and any return on investment would
most likely require years to realize.
IV. CONCLUSION
Because federal court is generally unavailable for class action
plaintiffs in consumer cases, potential class litigants and attorneys
desiring to bring class actions on behalf of consumers will gravitate
to state court systems in states that have liberal class action pro-
visions. The decisions of the Arkansas Supreme Court since 1988
construing Rule 23 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure have
made Arkansas class action procedure among the most favorable in
the nation for potential consumer class action plaintiffs. That lib-
eralization of Arkansas class action procedure is reflected in the
following actions of the court:
192. First Nat'l Bank, 304 Ark. at 201, 801 S.W.2d at 41.
193. In regard to the attorney paying costs associated with the litigation, such
as notice to the class, Rule 1.8(e) of the Arkansas Model Rules of Professional
Conduct provides:
A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection
with pending or contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the
repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter
ARK. R uLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(e) (1985). Addressing the same
subject, the leading authority on class action procedure comments:
[I]t is unrealistic, as well as a compromise of Rule 23, to assume that
any plaintiff, especially one who could not afford to bring an individual
action, would be able to support the often burdensome costs of notice
and other expenses in exchange for her or his share of a possible recovery.
Courts "cannot condone a policy which would effectively limit class action
plaintiffs to corporations, municipalities, or the rich." This approach may
only produce well-prrepared testimony by the class representative, who may
fully expect to be unable ever to reimburse counsel.
HERBERT NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS AcTIONs § 15.21, at 15-
64 (1992).
194. Rule 23(c) requires that the cost of notice initially be borne by the plaintiffs.
However, under the rule, if the case is settled or the plaintiffs prevail, the court
may impose the cost of notice on the defendants:
The cost of such notice shall be borne by the representative parties;
provided, however, that the court may shift all or part of such cost to
the opposing party or parties if the case is settled or the class representative
substantially prevails on the merits.
ARK. R. CIv. P. 23(c).
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1. The court replaced the requirement that all members of the
prospective class have a shared factual and legal interest in the
subject matter of the litigation95 with a requirement that there be
only some question of either law or fact common to the class.' 96
2. The court reduced the Rule 23(a)(3) prerequisite that the
claims or defenses of the representative parties be typical of those
of the class' 97 to a baseline "typicality" requirement that the de-
fendant's unlawful conduct adversely affect both the representative
parties and the class. 98
3. The court adopted a pragmatic and permissive interpretation
of the Rule 23(a)(4) requirement that the representative parties fairly
and adequately protect the interests of the class.'99 This interpretation
is reflected in the court's:
(a) acknowledging that conflict between the interests of the class
representative and some class members is inevitable but does not
necessarily jeopardize the maintenance of the case as a class
action;200
(b) recognizing that some protection is afforded class members
dissatisfied with class representation through the alternatives of
opting out of the class action, formally intervening in the class
action through their own counsel, and collaterally attacking the
settlement or judgment; 0'
(c) placing the burden in regard to the issue of competence of
class counsel on the defendant; 20 2
(d) considering most questions of misconduct of class counsel as
matters to be addressed through the attorney disciplinary process
rather than as bases for denying certification of the class under
the adequacy of representation standard;203 and
(e) viewing a trial court determination that the representation is
inadequate as a matter normally to be addressed by the court's
requiring additional terms and conditions to protect against any
unfairness rather than as cause for dismissal. 201
195. See supra text accompanying note 12.
196. See supra text accompanying note 30.
197. See supra part III.B.3.
198. See supra part III.B.3.
199. See supra part III.B.4.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 151-55.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 156-58.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 136-39.
203. See supra text accompanying note 146.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 159-61.
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4. The court replaced the concern that class actions will splinter
into numerous individual cases0 5 with the view that the trial court
can flexibly manage the case by creating subclasses of members
having more closely related interests in common. 206 Similarly, a trial
court's fear that individual issues will predominate over class issues2°"
can be addressed by first trying the common issues affecting all
class members and leaving individual issues for later determination. 208
The flexibility to deal with individual issues by creating subclasses
or by leaving those issues for later determination has led the Arkansas
Supreme Court to conclude, in direct contradistinction to its previous
attitude, that a class action will frequently be the superior means
of adjudication. 2°9
5. The court allowed interlocutory appeals of class certification
decisions .20
6. The court's concern about practical problems stemming from
class actions, such as lack of judicial and court staff resources, has
diminished. 21
7. The court replaced concern about the fairness to the defendant
of a class action2 12 with concern that failure to allow the case to
proceed as a class action would be unfair to the prospective members
of the plaintiff class.21 1
8. Perhaps most important, the court's attitude of near hostility
to class actions has shifted to a position that could be fairly char-
acterized as sympathetic to class actions. 21 4
Although Ark#nsas class action procedure has been greatly lib-
eralized, as a practical matter both sides in a case brought as a
consumer class action case may feel a very strong impetus to settle
the suit if a class is certified. The named plaintiffs and their counsel
may be wary of investing the resources, including the cost of notifying
the class, required to prosecute the case through trial and possible
appeal, and the defendant will be concerned that an ultimate judg-
205. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 65-66, 75-77.
207. See supra text accompanying notes 33, 34, 45, 46, 55-57; see also supra
part III.B.5.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 33, 34, 45, 46, 55-57; see also supra
part III.B.5.
209. See supra part II.C-E.
210. See supra part lI.B.
211. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50, 178-82.
212. See supra text accompanying notes 39-41.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 78-80.
214. See supra part II.D-E.
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ment awarding even a relatively nominal recovery to each member
of the class could be staggering.
Can the liberalization of Arkansas class action procedure be
characterized as a sound procedural development in the same sense
as the generally accepted soundness of the abolition of common law
pleading or the development of modern discovery? Unlike nearly
every other area of procedural law, the answer depends on the
political perspective of the person supplying the answer. As noted
by one of the leading authorities on civil procedure, "[t]he class
action . .. has been described as everything from 'one of the most
socially useful remedies in history' to 'legalized blackmail.' 215 How-
ever, for those who believe, as does the Arkansas Supreme Court,
that "it is possible that a large number of persons who may have
legitimate claims not worth pursuing because of the costs of our
system of justice may lose those claims if they are not allowed to
proceed together as a class '" 216 and that "[b]y not certifying a class,
a trial court can cause the problem to 'go away' to the extreme
disadvantage of the claimants . ,,z11 the liberalization of Arkansas
class action procedure is indeed a welcome development.
215. CHARLES A. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 507 (5th ed. 1994) (quoting
Pomerantz, New Developments in Class Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been
Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAW. 1259 (1970)("one of the most socially useful remedies in
history"); Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in An-
titrust Suits, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 9 (1971)("legalized blackmail")).






Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 23. Class Actions
(a) Prerequisites to Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only
if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative
parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and
the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy. As soon as practicable after the commencement of an
action brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order
whether it is to be so maintained. An order under this section may
be conditional and it may be altered or amended before the decision
on the merits.
(c) Notice. In any class action in which monetary relief is sought,
including actions for damages and restitution, the court shall direct
to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can
be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall: (1) describe
the action and the members' rights in it; (2) advise each member
that the court will exclude the member from the class if the member
so requests by a specified date: (3) advise each member that the
judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who
do not request exclusion; and (4) state that any member who does
not request exclusion may, if the member desires, participate in the
litigation, either in person or through counsel. The cost of such
notice shall be borne by the representative parties; provided, however,
that the court may shift all or part of such cost to the opposing
party or parties if the case is settled or the class representative
substantially prevails on the merits.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to
which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1)
determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to
prevent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of
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evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the mem-
bers of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action,
that notice be given in such manner as the court may direct to some
or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the proposed
extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of the members to
signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate,
to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise come into
the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or
on intervenors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to elim-
inate therefrom allegations as to representation of absent persons,
and that the action proceed accordingly; and (5) dealing with similar
procedural matters. The orders may be combined with an order
under Rule 16 and may be altered or amended from time to time
as may be desirable.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court. In cases where
the court has entered an order that an action shall be maintained
as a class action, notice of such proposed dismissal or compromise
shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the
court directs.
Reporter's Notes (as modified by the Court) to Rule 23: 1. Class
actions in Arkansas have been governed by Ark. Stat. Ann. 2-809
(Repl. 1962) which provide minimum procedural rules. This rule
does not change prior law.
2. Rule 23 confers broad discretion upon the trial court to dictate
such terms as are necessary to protect the rights of absent class
members. This discretion is also conferred upon the federal courts
by FRCP 23.
3. In Arkansas, many of the class action cases have involved actions
brought by and against members of unincorporated associations such
as labor unions. Thomas v. Dean, 245 Ark. 446, 432 S.W.2d 771
(1968); International Brotherhood v. Blassingame, 226 Ark. 614, 293
S.W.2d 444 (1956). See also Massey v. Rogers, 232 Ark. 110, 334
S.W.2d 664 (1960). Such actions shall henceforth be brought pursuant
to Rule 23.2.
4. Under prior Arkansas law, class actions could be maintained in
either law or equity. Thomas v. Dean, supra. This rule does not
affect jurisdiction and thus such actions may still be maintained in
either court.
Addition to Reporter's Note, 1990 Amendment: Subdivision (a) has
been completely rewritten to set out the requirements for numerosity,
commonality, typicality, and adequate representation. As revised,
subdivision (a) is identical to the corresponding federal rule. Former
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subdivision (c) has been modified slightly and redesignated as sub-
division (e). Under the revised version, which is based on the cor-
responding federal rule, notice of a proposed dismissal or compromise
is mandatory rather than discretionary. New subdivision (c) requires
that the best practicable notice of the pendency of class actions
seeking monetary relief, whether legal or equitable, be given to all
class members. Among other things, the notice must advise class
members of their right to participate in or be excluded from the
litigation. When monetary relief is sought, class members must, as
a matter of due process, be given such notice and afforded the
opportunity to "opt out" of the class action. See Phillips Petroleum
v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 (1985). It is not clear from Shutts whether
due process requires such notice when the class action involves only
injunctive or declaratory relief. Id. at 811, n.3. Subdivision (c) does
not impose such a requirement in such circumstances, but the trial
court may, pursuant to subdivision (d), order that notice be given.
The last sentence of subdivision (c) makes clear that the class rep-
resentatives must initially bear the cost of the notice, though such
cost may ultimately be shifted to the opposing parties. This practice
is followed in the federal courts. See Eisen v. Carlisle and Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156 (1974). Subdivision (d) has been revised to take into
account the foregoing changes and to spell out in further detail the
trial court's discretion in the management of a class action. It is
virtually identical to the corresponding federal rule.
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